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CLASH OF THE TITANS: THE DIFFICULT
RECONCILIATION OF A FAIR TRIAL AND A FREE
PRESS IN MODERN AMERICAN SOCIETY
Alfredo Garcia*
I. INTRODUCTION
In an epoch marked by the pervasive influence of the mass me-
dia in daily life, a fundamental clash sometimes evolves between a
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and the
media's liberty to report on matters it deems worthy of public inter-
est. This conflict is unique because it involves two of our most hal-
lowed rights, the First and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.' The dichotomy is compounded by the fact that neither
the Constitution nor the wisdom of the Founding Fathers sheds light
on the problem.2 Although the drafters of the Bill of Rights could
not have been oblivious to the potential conflict,' they can hardly be
faulted for not envisaging the widespread role the media would play
in twentieth century America.
Under normal circumstances, the rights to a fair trial and a free
press dovetail; that is, a free press satisfies the public's legitimate
concern with the workings of the criminal justice system, thereby
enhancing the fairness of a criminal proceeding. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an ef-
fective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power . . . .Without
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. A version of this
article appears in Professor Garcia's book, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE (1991).
1. The Sixth Amendment stipulates, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The First Amend-
ment provides, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976).
3. Id. Chief Justice Burger writes, "Neither in the Constitution nor in contemporaneous
writings do we find that the conflict between these two important rights was anticipated, yet it
is inconceivable that the authors of the Constitution were unaware of the potential conflicts
between the right to an unbiased jury and the guarantee of freedom of the press." Id.
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publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity,
all other checks are of small account." 4 However, when criminal ac-
tivity becomes the object of intense media scrutiny, the right of the
accused to a fair trial may be imperiled. As a consequence, the judi-
cial system confronts the dilemma, posed by Justice Black, of accom-
modating "two of the most cherished policies of our civilization,'
free speech and fair trials.'
The source of this predicament lies with the contradictory pur-
poses served by the Sixth and the First Amendments. Historically
and functionally, the rights to free speech and press do not promote
fairness.7 As a prominent scholar tells us, the First Amendment does
not demand press "responsibility," 8 and the framers "knew a parti-
san and scurrilous press, not a fair one."' In fact, fairness might
interfere with the media's role in serving as a check on government.
In contrast, the rights conferred on the accused by the Sixth Amend-
ment are designed to ensure fairness in the criminal process."0 The
difficult task the judiciary faces when these two titans clash is to
reconcile them without sacrificing the critical values fostered by each
right.
When these two fundamental guarantees are pitted against each
other, achieving a harmonious balance between them is formidable.
Given two competing constitutional interests, must a court necessa-
rily choose which one takes precedence? If a defendant's right to a
fair trial is "the most fundamental of all freedoms,"" must the right
to a free press yield to such an overriding interest? The Supreme
Court has emphatically asserted that no hierarchy of values inheres
in the safeguards enumerated in the Bill of Rights.' On other occa-
sions, however, former Chief Justice Burger has suggested that the
accused's right to a fair trial transcends the freedom of the press and
its right to keep the public informed about the criminal process. 8
4. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1948). As the Court has aptly remarked, "Pub-
lic scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfind-
ing process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole." Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
5. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
6. Id.
7. LUCAS A. PowE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 278 (1991).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 278-79.
11. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
12. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980).
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Nevertheless, when free speech and press and a fair trial have col-
lided, the Court has attempted to resolve the conflict "without essen-
tially abrogating one right or the other."1 '
Although the Court's struggle to harmonize these sometimes
conflicting rights has been a valiant one, its solution to the problem
has not been successful. Understandably, the Court has been loath to
encroach upon the media's right to report on the criminal justice sys-
tem because public access to the process advances fairness as well as
the appearance of fairness.18 Despite this justifiable reluctance, the
Court has failed to produce a workable method for protecting a
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury when
the freedoms of speech and press potentially infringe on that pre-
cious right. To a large extent, this flaw derives from the failure to
recognize that the media's role is not to promote fairness. On the
other hand, fairness is the preeminent value advanced by the Sixth
Amendment's safeguard of a fair trial by an impartial jury. 6
Conceptually, the attempt to resolve the conflict between a free
press and a fair trial may be divided into two categories: (1) the
degree to which the press may be restrained from divulging informa-
tion which threatens the right to a fair trial, and (2) the viable reme-
dies that exist to blunt the damaging effects of prejudicial pretrial
publicity. These two classifications are analytically linked because
the resolution of the first category dictates the strength of the reme-
dies required by the second category. Accordingly, these categories
will be viewed in sequence to determine whether the Court's ap-
proach represents an equitable solution to this delicate quandary.
II. To CLOSE OR NOT TO CLOSE?
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court presciently
appreciated the widespread repercussions of mass communication
and universal education upon criminal cases.1 Those cases generat-
ing extensive public interest garnered the "attention of all the intelli-
gent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one [could] be found
among those best fitted for jurors who [had] not heard or read of
[them]." 8 Indeed, nearly a century before, Chief Justice Marshall
14. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring).
15. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 569-72; Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. at 508.
16. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
17. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878), overruled by Thomas v. Re-
view Bd. of Indiana Employment, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
18. Id.
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encountered the problem of selecting an unbiased, impartial jury in
the celebrated treason trial of Aaron Burr. 9 Media coverage of the
controversy between Burr and President Jefferson led Burr's attor-
neys to question the ability of jurors who had followed the feud to
act impartially. 0
Technological advances in the twentieth century, combined with
the media's increasing coverage of government and politics, have
made the task of selecting an impartial jury in a highly publicized
criminal case a difficult proposition.21 Consequently, a trial court in
such a situation must attempt to stem the flow of prejudicial public-
ity from reaching the public in the hope that a jury untainted by the
information may be selected. If that arrangement is not possible,
then the judge must ensure that a jury exposed to such information
is willing and able to set aside its preconceived notions and decide
the case solely on the evidence presented.2" Though the first alterna-
tive is preferable since it enhances the probability of finding an im-
partial jury, it runs head-on into the freedom of the media to report
on matters of public interest.
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,8 the trial judge sought to
prevent confessions, admissions, "or facts 'strongly implicative' of the
accused"2 4 from being disseminated by the media.2" His concern was
justified by the fact that the defendant was charged with murduring
six members of a family in a small community.2" In addition, the
crime had attracted considerable local, regional, and national media
coverage."' Therefore, the judge imposed a "gag order" on the re-
lease of such information by the media, which encompassed details
relating to the crime revealed in the defendant's "open" preliminary
hearing.28 The rationale backing the judge's order was the "clear
and present danger that pre-trial publicity could impinge upon the
19. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49-51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
20. Id.
21. See Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of
Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 631, 635-36 (1991).
22. This was the standard fashioned by Chief Justice Marshall in the Burr case, 25 F.
Cas. 49-51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g), and followed by the Court in Reynolds, 98 U.S.
145 (1878). Subsequently, the modern Court followed that criterion in Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961).
23. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
24. Id. at 541.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 541-42.
27. Id. at 542-43.
28. Id.
1110 [Vol. 32
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defendant's right to a fair trial."2
Finding the trial court's order to be "speculative," the majority
believed the court's remedy was deficient;30 in the process, the Court
fashioned a three-part test to determine whether a pretrial restraint
complies with constitutional strictures."' The criteria the Stuart
Court adopted were: the nature and scope of pretrial coverage;
whether other measures would effectively counter the adverse pre-
trial publicity; and whether a gag order would achieve its intended
effect.8" Applying these standards to the facts at hand, the Stuart
Court concluded that other remedies would have sufficed and that
the restraining order would have been futile given the small size of
the community and the gravity of the crime."8
More important, the majority acknowledged the obstacles to
"managing and enforcing pretrial restraining orders.""" Specifically,
such problems center on the difficulty of overinclusiveness or under-
inclusiveness: that is, the extent to which the trial court can predict
with accuracy what information will poison potential jurors, and the
limited jurisdiction of a state court to enjoin the national press from
publishing details about the crime." Though the trial judge in Stu-
art attempted not to craft an overly sweeping order, the Supreme
Court was reluctant to sanction the proposed solution. 6 The decision
conveys the Court's distaste for a pretrial restraining order as a
workable resolution to the problem for prejudicial pretrial publicity.
Thus, the court bears a "heavy burden" in establishing before trial
that prior restraint is the only means of securing a fair trial.3 7
The trial judge in Stuart committed a major blunder by at-
tempting to preclude the media from reporting the results of a pro-
ceeding open to the public.36 As a result, the trial judge could not
rely on precedent to prevent the press from reporting a public event.
What the Supreme Court left open, however, was the possibility that
a trial judge could close the hearing to the press and public. 9
Taking the cue from Stuart, the trial judge in Gannett Co. v.
29. Id. at 543.
30. Id. at 563-65.
31. Id. at 562.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 563-67.
34. Id. at 565.
35. Id. at 565-69.
36. Id. at 566-67.
37. Id. at 569.
38. d. at 568.
39. Id. at 564 n.8.
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DePasquale40 closed a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress a
confession and a gun in a publicized murder prosecution. 4 The pub-
licity surrounding the murder was neither sensational nor unusual;
indeed, it may have been characterized as largely factual in nature
and not particularly prejudicial toward the defendants' right to a fair
trial.4" Nevertheless, the defense sought closure of the suppression
hearing because "the unabated buildup" of pretrial publicity endan-
gered their clients' right to receive a fair trial.43 The prosecution did
not oppose the motion and the press representative did not object
when the defense made the request.44
In sharp contrast to its solicitude for freedom of the press in
Stuart, the Gannett Court focused on the accused's stake in a fair
trial. Heralding a novel approach to the free press-fair trial contro-
versy, the Gannett majority found no common law or constitutional
right for public attendance of pretrial or trial proceedings.4 Rather,
the fact that the accused's right to a public trial is grouped with
other defendant-related rights meant that it inured to the accused
and not to the public (or press) at large.4 Nonetheless, the Court
left open the question not squarely before it: that is, whether the
First and Fourteenth Amendments provided a right for the public to
attend criminal trials.4 The tone and rationale underlying Gannett,
however, strongly suggested that perhaps the Court was willing to
subordinate the public's and, derivatively, the press's right to attend
pretrial or trial proceedings, if such access jeopardized a criminal
defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
Precisely one year later, however, the Court granted the press
and the general public a constitutional right of access to criminal
trials in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.4' Relying on com-
mon law tradition, and the implicit notion that the First Amendment
protects the right to access, the Court reasoned that a presumption of
openness inheres in the nature of a criminal trial. 9 The structural
40. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
41. Id. at 375.
42. Id. at 371-74.
43. Id. at 375.
44. Id. at 375.
45. Id. at 379-91.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 392.
48. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
49. Id. at 573-80. The plurality opinion in Richmond was written by Chief Justice
Burger. However, the concurring opinions of the other justices concurred in the notion that the
First Amendment and, derivatively, the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteed public access to
criminal trials. Id. at 581-604. Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Gannett, found a right to
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dimension to the First Amendment is integral to our democratic sys-
tem and compels a public trial to safeguard the judicial process and
the "republican system of self-government.""0
Richmond Newspapers provided inauspicious circumstances
under which to persuade the Court to close a trial to the public.
Nonetheless, the trial court certainly had sufficient basis to believe
that its order would be upheld given the message conveyed in Gan-
nett. However, with a shaky set of facts justifying closure, the Court
would have been hard-pressed to ratify the trial court's order. The
flimsy excuse to close the trial to the press and public was the fact
that the defendant's murder trial had ended in mistrials on four pre-
vious occasions, one mistrial occurring because a prospective juror
had read about the defendant's previous trials in a newspaper and
had told other jurors before the retrial began." Therefore, the ac-
cused's counsel was concerned about prejudicial information being
exchanged by the jurors, especially in light of the fact that the crime
took place in a small community."
The factual predicate underlying Richmond buttresses the Stu-
art Court's contention that closure of any part of a criminal proceed-
ing on the basis of speculative prejudice to the defendant's right to a
fair trial is risky business."3 What made the trial court's decision in
Richmond indefensible was the fact that its order was overly broad
in comparison with the danger presented. The publicity in Rich-
mond was apparently less pervasive than in Stuart. After all, the
crime in Richmond did not attract national publicity, as was the case
in Stuart." Moreover, the community in Stuart was exceedingly
small, 55 casting doubt on the apprehension expressed by counsel in
Richmond. Finally, the trial court in Richmond closed the entire
trial to the public,56 while the trial judge in Stuart drafted a narrow
orcer designed to prevent disclosure of the defendant's damaging
admissions.5
7
Consistent with the nexus between openness and fair process,
and the "structural" role played by the First Amendment, the teach-
ing of Richmond meshes with a defendant's right to a fair trial. Fur-
access in the Sixth Amendment as well as in the First. Id. at 603.
50. Id. at 587-94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 559-61.
52. Id.
53. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976).
54. Id. at 542.
55. The town population was 850. Id.
56. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 560 (1980).
57. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 542-44.
19921 1113
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ther, it is unlikely in an "age of mass media" that closing a trial to
the press and public will be an effective antidote to adverse prejudi-
cial publicity. Publicity in a notorious case will begin when the
crime is discovered." The impact of such publicity will continue un-
abated during the course of pretrial hearings. Thus, closing a trial to
the public and precluding the media from reporting about it is akin
to attempting to turn back the clock. Sequestering the jury or ad-
monishing jurors to avoid media exposure about the case, although
not foolproof remedies, furnish better alternatives to closure.59
Evidently, Richmond laid to rest the question whether a trial
could be closed to the public, though four justices intimated that the
right to attend a trial was not absolute, thereby perhaps yielding to
an "overriding" interest." The overriding interest would presumably
be a defendant's right to a fair trial, though the plurality in Rich-
mond failed to articulate that interest because the trial court's justifi-
cation for closure was deficient. At any rate, Richmond makes clear
that closing a trial is an extreme measure which is warranted, if at
all, only under exceptional circumstances. 61
Clarifying its stance on the matter, the Court held in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court" that a state must justify its at-
tempt to close a criminal trial by showing a compelling interest. 63
Additionally, the government must establish that the denial of access
is "narrowly tailored" to serve the compelling interest." As a result,
the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute which sought to pro-
tect minor victims of sex crimes by excluding the press and the pub-
lic from the courtroom."8 The Globe majority rejected the two inter-
ests advanced by the state: sparing the alleged victims from further
trauma and embarrassment, and encouraging the victims to report
sexual crimes and testify truthfully." Although the majority agreed
that avoiding "psychological trauma" of young victims was a com-
58. Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass
Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV., 631, 633 (1991). As the authors point out, "It is often impossible
for a judge to control the publication of prejudicial information because, increasingly, the most
dramatic revelations occur at the time of the crime itself, long before there is a trial, much less
a judge selected to oversee the trial." Id.
59. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).
60. Id. at 581. This position was taken by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Stevens, and Stewart.
61. Id. at 581.
62. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
63. Id. at 606-07.
64. Id. at 606-07.
65. Id. at 610-11.
66. Id. at 607.
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pelling interest,67 such a concern did not justify a per se closure rule.
Instead, a "case-by-case" approach was proper, with the trial judge
taking into account such factors as the minor victim's age, psycholog-
ical maturity, the nature of the crime, and the wishes of the victim
and her parents.68 The crucial issue in Globe inexorably leads to the
conclusion that, in such circumstances, closure comports neither with
the Constitution nor with the purposes served by the First and Sixth
Amendments. To the degree that openness enhances the structural
role of the First Amendment by keeping the public informed and
ensuring the integrity and fairness of the judicial process, closure ill
serves that function. Juxtaposed against the fair play values fostered
by the Sixth Amendment, a governmental interest, no matter how
"compelling," hardly supports a denial of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial.
Despite the elaboration of Richmond's dictates in Globe News-
papers,69 a majority of the justices saw fit to return to the issue
raised by Gannett: under what conditions, if any, may a court ex-
clude the media and public from a pretrial hearing to safeguard a
defendant's right to a fair trial? Before reaching that inquiry, how-
ever, the Court had to determine whether the presumption of open
criminal trials extended to the jury selection process. Answering that
question affirmatively, the Court viewed the jury selection process as
a central component of the criminal justice system.
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court70 (Press-Enterprise I),
involved the interracial sexual attack and murder of a fifteen year
old.71 To encourage honest responses by potential jurors, the prose-
cutor requested the closure of the jury selection process to the press
and public.7 ' The trial court complied with the state's wishes, closing
all but three days of the six-week selection process to the public.73
Holding that an alternative method (i.e., questioning a juror in
chambers upon an affirmative request) would have sufficiently pro-
67. Id. at 607-08.
68. Id. An interesting facet of Globe Newspapers is the defendant's objection to the
closure of the trial proceedings to the press and public. Id. at 699. Since the defendant has a
constitutional right to insist on a public trial according to the Sixth Amendment, to what
extent may the government's interest in closing a trial override a defendant's constitutional
right? If the government satisfies the "compelling" interest standard delineated in Globe News-
papers, and the defendant objects, is the trial judge justified in denying access to the media and
the public? This question was not explored by the Court in Globe Newspapers.
69. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
70. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
71. Id. at 521 (Marshall, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 503.
73. Id.
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tected the jurors' privacy concerns, the Court found that the stringent
test set forth in Globe was not satisfied."' Therefore, absent a com-
pelling interest in a juror's privacy, closing voir dire proceedings to
the public violates the First Amendment.75
Buoyed by its victory, Press-Enterprise Company subsequently
challenged the exclusion of the media and the public in a mass-mur-
der case. 7" The facts of Press-Enterprise I17 constitute the stuff me-
dia thrives on: the murder of twelve patients by a male nurse who
allegedly administered massive doses of the heart drug lidocaine. 7'
Invoking a state statute,7' the defendant, unopposed by the state, suc-
cessfully moved to close his preliminary hearing from media and
public scrutiny. The hearing lasted forty-one days, consisting largely
of scientific and medical evidence. Subsequently, the court acceded to
the accused's desire to keep transcripts of the hearing from the press
and public for the same reason the accused sought to exclude the
public from the preliminary hearing: the potential infringement of
his right to a fair and impartial trial.' 0
Reaching the opposite conclusion embodied in Gannett, Press-
Enterprise II saw a tradition of accessibility to pretrial hearings."
Moreover, the unique adversarial features which characterize the
preliminary hearing in California approximate a trial in many re-
spects.82 These two premises led the majority to conclude that a pre-
liminary hearing may be closed only if a "substantial probability"
exists that the defendant's fair-trial rights will be compromised." A
second prong of the formulation requires the court to determine that
other "reasonable" alternatives to closure will not preserve the ac-
74. Id. at 510-12. The potentially embarrassing information which could dissuade ajuror from being candid might involve a sexual attack on the juror or a member of the juror's
family. Id. at 512. The Globe "overriding interest" was found wanting because the trial court
failed to consider alternatives to closure. d. at 510-13.
75. As Justice Stevens cogently pointed out in his concurring opinion, the defendant did
not oppose the closure based on his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Hence, the Court
did not reach the issue whether selection of the jury was part of the trial for Sixth Amendment
purposes. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 3.
79. California Penal Code § 868 permits closure of preliminary hearings if the "exclu-
sion of the public is necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair and impartial
trial." CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1985).
80. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. at 4-5.
81. Id. at 10-11.
82. Id. at 11-12.
83. Id. at 13-14.
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cused's right to an unbiased jury.8
Press-Enterprise II represents the logical culmination of the
Court's efforts to jealously safeguard the tradition of openness with
respect to criminal proceedings. The defendant faces a nearly insur-
mountable barrier: He or she must show that a substantial
probability exists that pretrial publicity will so taint the community
as to preclude the selection of an unbiased jury. In light of the "spec-
ulative" nature of such an endeavor, closure of a pretrial proceeding
is highly unlikely in the wake of Press-Enterprise I. If the Court is
not content with the accused demonstrating a "reasonable likelihood
of prejudice," then its value judgment is predicated upon the notion
that "the community 'therapeutic value' of openness predominates
over the defendant's right to a fair trial."8
The bottom line to the Court's doctrinal approach inescapably
leads to one conclusion: Absent compelling and highly unusual cir-
cumstances, a criminal defendant will not be able to prevent the me-
dia and public from attending either pretrial proceedings or a trial
because prejudicial pretrial publicity might impinge upon the right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Nor, for that matter, will the
accused successfully prohibit "the publication by the press of any
information pertaining to pending judicial proceedings or the opera-
tion of the criminal justice system, no matter how shabby the means
by which the information is obtained."86
Usually, fair process norms advanced by both the tradition of
openness and the defendant's interest in a jury untarnished by
preconceived notions of the accused's guilt coincide. When they con-
flict, however, the Court has not embraced the remedy of excluding
the media as a means of avoiding prejudicial publicity from poison-
ing jurors' attitude toward the defendant. One can certainly under-
stand the Court's 'eluctance to do so, for it contravenes the essence of
a democratic form of government. Secrecy is not a cherished value in
a "republican" society. However, accessibility has its price; when it
.conflicts with a defendant's equally important right to a fair trial, an
accommodation is necessary. If we are unwilling to tolerate closed
criminal proceedings, then we must avert "the sacrifice of precious
Sixth Amendment rights on the altar of the First Amendment. '87
84. Id. at 14.
85. Id. at 13 (quoting Richmond Newspapers Co. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570
(1980)).
86. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 588 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 612.
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III. JUROR REMOVAL THROUGH VOIR DIRE
Given the Court's aversion to closure as a remedy to protect a
defendant's right to an impartial jury, only one alternative exists to
ensure a fair trial: removing from jury service potential jurors who
have strong biases against the defendant and who are unwilling or
unable to set aside their partiality. Since the treason trial of Aaron
Burr,"8 courts have grappled with the problem of identifying and
accurately assessing the extent and intensity of the venire's predispo-
sitions toward the defendant. In addition, courts have sought to de-
termine the applicable criteria for disqualifying a potential juror on
grounds of bias. Finally, courts have constructed remedies designed
to attenuate the effects of partiality and thereby enhance the prospect
of a fair trial. Unfortunately, these palliatives have not proven to be
effective, thus hampering the search for an equitable balance be-
tween a free press and a fair trial. The reasons for this failure merit
a historical and pragmatic approach to the issue.
A. Historical Underpinnings
Building upon the edifice created by John Marshall in the trea-
son trial of Aaron Burr,"' Chief Justice Waite developed a visionary
perspective on the issue of juror partiality in Reynolds v. United
States." Waite followed Marshall's lead in Burr.9 Marshall re-
jected the suggestion by Burr's defense counsel that the constitutional
guarantee to an "impartial jury" meant that jurors should be "per-
fectly indifferent and free from prejudice."92 Waite aptly concluded
that such a threshold would be insuperable in light of modern ad-
vances in communications.9 Opinions as to the guilt of the defendant
would not preclude a juror from serving; rather, the defendant ought
to bear the burden of demonstrating that the juror's opinion was
strong enough to raise a "presumption of partiality."9 '
Moreover, Waite believed that a trial court's finding on the is-
sue of partiality should be accorded deference. A trial court's deter-
mination should "not be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the
error is manifest."9" Although Waite's calibration placed the onus on
88. See supra part II.
89. See supra part II.
90. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
91. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49-51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
92. Id.
93. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. at 155-56.
94. Id. at 156-57.
95. Id. at 156.
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the defendant to establish juror bias, he did not put forth a coherent
test for determining when the presumption of partiality arises. In-
deed, he admitted that courts had not reached accord on when an
opinion disqualified a juror, other than agreeing upon the notion
that the opinion must be unyielding and not a "mere impression,"
subject to dissipation through evidence presented in court. 96
Perhaps we ought not chastise Chief Justice Waite for failing to
develop a comprehensive standard of jury impartiality. What is
troubling about Reynolds is the tremendous burden the defendant
must shoulder to exclude a presumptively biased juror. Assuming the
juror has formed an opinion on the defendant's guilt, it is up to the
accused to identify the bias, demonstrate its intensity, and convince
the trial judge that the juror's "impressions" are not fleeting, but are
firmly etched within the recesses of the mind. More important, if the
defendant seeks to reverse the conviction on the basis of juror bias,
the trial court's findings are to be given wide latitude by the appel-
late tribunal.
B. Recent Trends
Nearly a century later, the Court lessened the defendant's bur-
den in proving bias. In Irvin v. Dowd,'7 Justice Clark recognized
that a crime may engender such a "pattern of deep and bitter
prejudice" in a community that bias against the defendant may be
presumed." Irvin represents a perfect example of a small commu-
nity poisoned by pervasive publicity against a defendant charged
with six murders.99 Under those circumstances, the jurors' assertions
of impartiality could not be given credence, because "the psychologi-
cal impact requiring such a declaration before one's fellows is often
its father." ' The unbelievability of such statements was betrayed
by the fact that the voir dire revealed most prospective jurors had
some opinion about the defendant's guilt and that eight of the twelve
jurors in the case thought the defendant was guilty.10 1
Irvin is enlightening in four other respects. First, Justice Clark
emphasized the elusive nature of impartiality. Quoting Chief Justice
Hughes, Justice Clark observed that "[i]mpartiality is not a technical
96. Id. at 155.
97. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
98. Id. at 727.
99. Id. at 719-20.
100. Id. at 728.
101. Id. at 727-28.
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conception"; rather, "[ilt is a state of mind."' 02 Therefore, no talis-
manic formula is available to flesh out this "mental attitude."103 Sec-
ond, Irvin establishes the proposition that "a trial by jurors having a
fixed, preconceived opinion of the accused's guilt" violates due pro-
cess.'" As a corollary, such a fixed belief exists, despite protestations
to the contrary, when deep prejudice against the defendant perme-
ates the community. Third, Irvin acknowledges that juror impartial-
ity is not synonymous with the lack of a preconceived notion of guilt.
Instead, a juror is deemed to be impartial if "the juror can lay aside
his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence
presented in court."' 0 5 Fourth, when a community in which the
crime occurred is so prejudiced against the defendant, presumably a
change of venue, the relief requested in Irvin, is warranted.
Irvin has subsequently been construed as fashioning a two-part
test for detecting juror bias derived from the juror's knowledge or
opinions about the case.106 The first part of the test permits the de-
fendant to show actual prejudice through responses elicited in voir
dire and other evidence. 07 The second part of the test provides relief
by presuming prejudice from the circumstances surrounding the
trial. '08
Faithfully applying the Irvin formula, the Court in Rideau v.
Louisiana0 9 presumed prejudice when the defendant's confession
was televised three times to a viewing audience comprising the bulk
of the community. " Consequently, the accused was denied a fair
trial, and due process of law, when his request for a change of venue
was denied." The "spectacle" of the defendant's televised confession
was tantamount to Rideau's trial.11 Under these circumstances, re-
view of the voir dire to determine partiality was not necessary. "'
The presumed prejudice standard was substantially diluted by
two cases in which extensive pretrial publicity exposed potential ju-
rors to the defendants' prior convictions as well as other inadmissible
102. Id. at 724 (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145 (1936)).
103. Id. at 724-25 (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. at 145-46).
104. Id. at 724.
105. Id. at 723.
106. Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of
Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 642-43 (1991).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
110. Id. at 724.
111. Id. at 726.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 727.
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evidence. Murphy v. Florida"" involved the burglary, robbery, and
assault charges against the notorious convicted murderer and jewel
thief, Jack ("Murph the Surf") Murphy. The venire in Murphy's
case was aware of his prior convictions for murder and his famous
theft of the Star of India sapphire from a museum in New York.
Further, potential jurors were also exposed to news accounts of the
crimes with which he was charged."' These circumstances were not
promising for Murphy's ability to obtain a fair trial; however, the
Supreme Court thought the defendant's right to a fair trial was not
abridged."'
The majority's puzzling conclusion derived from its narrow and
somewhat skewed reading of the record as well as its restrictive in-
terpretation of the presumed prejudice test. Presumed prejudice, ac-
cording to the Murphy majority, occurs only when criminal proceed-
ings take on a "circus atmosphere" and thus lack "the solemnity and
sobriety to which a defendant is entitled.1117 In contrast, mere juror
exposure to the defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts
surrounding the crime with which he is charged do not automatically
lead to prejudice. 18 In the absence of a "circus atmosphere," there-
fore, the accused bears the burden of proving actual juror bias
through voir dire questioning.1 9
Pointing to jurors' professions of impartiality, and distinguish-
ing familiarity with the defendant's past and a predisposition against
the defendant, the Court found no evidence of juror bias against
Murphy.1 " Moreover, the majority stressed that most of the public-
ity about the defendant had appeared seven months before the jury
was chosen." 1 Finally, the Court took comfort in the fact that only
twenty out of seventy-eight potential jurors were excused because
they indicated a predisposition against Murphy. This led to the as-
sumption that the jurors' assertions of impartiality could be taken at
face value, for the jury pool was not as poisoned as that in Irvin. 2
114. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
115. Id. at 795-96.
116. Id. at 803.
117. Id. at 798-99. The Court paraded as examples of this barrage of publicity and
circus atmosphere the trials in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961), Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965).
118. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. at 799.
119. Id. at 800.
120. Id. at 800-03.
121. Id. at 802.
122. Id. at 803.
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A distorted view of the record colored the majority's facile per-
ceptions in Murphy. Contrary to its factual premises, at least one
juror obtained her knowledge during the week of the trial from a
newspaper article which described Murphy as a "beach boy hood-
lum serving a life sentence for murder."1 ' Another juror stated that
other comments by venire members had made him "sick to [his]
stomach.' 1 2 4 In fact, venirepersons had characterized Murphy as
"thoroughly rotten," and called for Murphy's conviction.'2 These
comments do not convey the sense of impartiality and fairness to
which the majority readily subscribed.
If Murphy made difficult a showing of presumed or actual
prejudice, Patton v. Yount"' converted the process into a herculean
exploit. In Patton, the defendant had been previously convicted of
the murder and rape of an eighteen-year old student in a small
Pennsylvania community. His conviction was reversed because an il-
legally secured confession was used against him at trial. He was sub-
sequently tried and convicted of murder four years after the first
trial. " Before Yount's second trial, publicity disclosed his previous
conviction for murder, his confession, and his previous plea of tem-
porary insanity, all of which were inadmissible at trial. "' The voir
dire also revealed that nearly all members of the jury pool (161 out
of 163) had heard about the case and that seventy-seven percent ad-
mitted they would carry an opinion into the jury box.' Addition-
ally, eight of the fourteen jurors and alternates who found Yount
guilty admitted that they had formed an opinion on his guilt.'8 0
Though these factual circumstances paralleled those present in
Irvin,"' the Patton majority found no prejudice to the defendant's
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Rather, it seized upon Mur-
phy's rationale that the passage of time mitigates the damaging ef-
fects of pretrial publicity. Noting that four years passed between
Yount's two trials, the majority stressed the lapse of time as having
"a profound effect on the community and, more important, on the
123. Id. at 806 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 807.
125. Id.
126. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
127. Id. at 1026-28. The prosecution dismissed the rape charge prior to the second trial.
Id. at 1027.
128. Id. at 1029.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1029-30.
131. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
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jury, in softening or effacing opinion." 1 32 To bolster its weak ration-
ale, the Court emphasized the factual nature of articles which ap-
peared on a daily basis during the course of jury selection. "
It is disingenuous to suggest that jurors exposed to negative
publicity about the accused can maintain their impartiality. Specifi-
cally, in both Murphy and Patton, jurors learned about otherwise
inadmissible evidence. In Murphy's case, they knew about his previ-
ous escapades with the Star of India theft and his prior murder con-
viction." In Yount's case, jurors were aware of his confession, his
previous conviction for the crime for which he was on trial, and the
fact that he had raised the insanity defense at his first trial, but
abandoned it in the second trial. 3 5 The evidence the jurors were
exposed to in both Murphy and Yount was inadmissible. Of course,
the reason such evidence is inadmissible is not only because it is
deemed irrelevant or because it was unconstitutionally obtained; it is
inadmissible due to its devastating and negative impact upon the
jury. Common sense dictates that a juror will consciously or uncon-
sciously hold a conviction against the accused. One juror in the Mur-
phy case readily admitted that he would be hard pressed to ignore
Murphy's criminal record during the course of deliberations.1 6
The adverse influence of such inadmissible evidence is con-
firmed by the attitude it generates among potential jurors. In Patton,
for example, nine veniremen who were unsuccessfully challenged for
cause asserted that their opinions concerning Yount's guilt would be
changed only if the defendant could convince them otherwise." ' A
juror who ultimately decided Yount's fate shared the same atti-
tude. " 8 Similarly, a juror who was seated for Murphy's trial testi-
fied during voir dire that, in light of what he knew about Murphy's
past through pretrial publicity, he would find him guilty if Murphy
did not testify or offer other exculpatory evidence.1 '
Despite these negative effects created by pretrial publicity, a
criminal defendant faces incredible odds in showing either actual or
presumed prejudice. The teaching of Murphy and Patton is that a
case must be a "rare breed" to "exceed the extremely high threshold
132. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1033 (1984).
133. Id. at 1032.
134. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 795-96 (1975).
135. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1029.
136. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. at 805 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
137. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1045 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1046.
139. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. at 804-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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test of presumed prejudice requiring a change of venue." 4" Absent a
"carnival atmosphere" in which the defendant is tried and convicted
before the trial process begins, it is unlikely a defendant will success-
fully meet the presumed prejudice criterion. The upshot of this phe-
nomenon is unmistakable; the recourse for a defendant who is the
subject of prejudicial pretrial publicity is to establish actual prejudice
by eliciting juror bias through the jury selection process.
However, the process of extracting an admission of bias by a
potential juror is an exceedingly difficult one. This problem may
stem from the juror's desire to conceal his or her bias, or from the
juror's failure to recognize the prejudice."" Indeed, this phenomenon
emerges graphically in Smith v. Phillips.4 In that case, a juror
sought employment with the prosecution as an investigator during
the course of the defendant's trial. Unaware of this fact during the
trial, the defendant attempted to reverse his conviction on due pro-
cess grounds based on the juror's conduct as well as on the prosecu-
tion's failure to divulge the fact to the defense.14 Finding no "im-
plied bias" in the juror's conduct, the Court held that his action did
not impair his ability to render an impartial verdict."'
What option did the accused have in Phillips? According to the
Court, he could prove actual bias, thereby maintaining his right to
an impartial jury.'" This conclusion is predicated upon the Court's
overly sanguine view that voir dire adequately identifies juror bias.
In fact, the Court's assumption is that questioning potential jurors is
sufficient to identify juror bias, "even in a community saturated with
publicity adverse to the defendant."'" Even though the Court has
140. Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir. 1985). In that case, the appel-
late court painstakingly detailed the adverse pretrial publicity. Id. at 1491-1533.
141. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
also Robert P. Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An Opportunity for Coexistence, 29
STAN. L. REV. 561, 565 (1977).
142. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
143. Id. at 212-14.
144. Id. at 215, 220. Justice O'Connor posited in her concurring opinion circumstances
under which "implied" bias would automatically attach: for example, if a juror is employed by
the prosecution; if the juror is related to a trial participant or to a member of the criminal
enterprise; or if the juror "was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction." Id.
at 222 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also cited Leonard v. United States, 378
U.S. 544 (1964) (per curiam), in which "the Court held that prospective jurors who had heard
the trial court announce the defendant's guilty verdict in the first trial should be automatically
disqualified from sitting on a second trial on similar charges." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at
223-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215-16 (citing Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S.
162, 171-72 (1950)).
146. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1030 (1984) (quoting from Judge Garth's concur-
1124 [Vol. 32
FAIR TRIAL / FREE PRESS
not formally embraced this proposition, for practical purposes its
doctrine has faithfully adopted it.
C. The Efficacy of Remedies Designed to Elicit Actual Bias
As the preceding discussion indicates, the judicial system has
placed confidence in the ability of trial courts to elicit actual juror
bias through the voir dire process. However, this reliance is mis-
placed, lacking an empirical or common sense foundation. One re-
cent study confirms the fact that no direct empirical evidence points
to the effectiveness of judges' and attorneys' voir dire challenges as
an antidote for prejudicial pretrial publicity. 4 ' From a practical
standpoint, one can discern the failure of voir dire to draw accurate
or honest responses from potential jurors. The available evidence,
moreover, shows that jurors do not admit their biases and preconcep-
tions during voir dire. 4 A variety of reasons account for this phe-
nomenon: jurors' inability or unwillingness to recognize bias; a de-
fensive attitude generated by suggestions of prejudice; lack of candor
fostered by the inhibiting nature of judicial questioning; haste and
the nature and detail of voir dire questions. 49
Other remedies designed to cure prejudicial pretrial publicity
also fall short of the mark. For example, continuances granted to
ameliorate public passion conflict with a defendant's right to a
speedy trial, judicial instructions admonishing jurors to disregard in-
formation gleaned outside the courtroom are unavailing from a prac-
tical as well as from an empirical perspective, and jury deliberation
serves to magnify, rather than diminish, existing biases. Finally, a
change of venue is at variance with the defendant's right to be tried
in the community in which the crime occurred and may clash with
the community's desire to mete out justice in the case.1"
Despite the deficiencies inherent in these remedies, the Ameri-
can judicial system has put faith in the jury selection process as the
most effective means of identifying actual juror bias. In Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart,"' for example, the Supreme Court advised
ring opinion in the court below, 710 F.2d 956, 979 (1983)).
147. Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with
Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 671 (1991).
148. Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of
Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 650 (1991).
149. Id. at 650-54.
150. Id. at 646-49. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that a defendant
has a right to be tried before a "jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
151. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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trial courts to engage in "searching questioning" of potential jurors
to detect those with "fixed opinions as to guilt or innocence." 1"
Given courts' aversion to a change of venue as a way of remedying
pretrial publicity, the defendant's primary weapon is a thorough voir
dire process, conducted by either the judge or the attorneys, which is
designed to flesh out potential jurors' actual attitudes and feelings
about the case.
The ability of the defendant to employ the jury selection process
to extract admissions of prejudice by potential jurors has been se-
verely curtailed by the Court's opinion in Mu'Min v. Virginia."' In
that case, the majority held that questioning a potential juror about
the content of pretrial publicity to which he was exposed is not con-
stitutionally mandated.' 4 Therefore, a trial judge may ask general
.questions of a jury panel en masse to be assured of a juror's sup-
posed impartiality, without ever evoking a response from the juror.
In essence, the trial court may presume impartiality from a juror's
silence in response to generic questions posed by the judge about the
effect of pretrial publicity on the juror's ability to render a fair
verdict."'
In Mu'Min, the defendant was charged with the murder of a
store owner in Prince William County, Virginia. Mu'Min commit-
ted the crime after escaping from his work detail assignment during
a lunch break." The defendant was a convicted murderer who was
serving a forty-eight year prison sentence.' 7 Considerable publicity
attended the circumstances of the crime. Specifically, forty-seven
newspaper articles detailed the nature of the crime, Mu'Min's crimi-
nal record, and the fact that the defendant had been rejected for pa-
role six times and had committed numerous prison infractions."' In
addition, the pretrial accounts described the circumstances of the
murder for which Mu'Min had been convicted, reported the fact that
he escaped the death penalty for the murder because it was not
available when he was convicted, and indicated that the defendant
had confessed to the murder of the store owner.' 59 Finally, newspa-
per articles decried the flaws associated with the prison work-crew
152. Id. at 564.
153. 111 S.Ct. 1899 (1991).
154. Id. at 1908.
155. Id. at 1919 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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system and suggested reform.160
Rejecting the accused's motion for a change of venue, the trial
judge instead relied upon the voir dire process to elicit juror bias.""
Further, the court refused the defendant's request to ask potential
jurors questions about the content of news accounts they may have
seen or read." 2 In fact, sixteen out of twenty-six potential jurors
admitted to having read or heard information about the offense or
the accused through the news media or other sources." In an at-
tempt to discern the jurors' impartiality, the trial judge asked four
generic, open-ended questions which essentially asked jurors whether
the information they were exposed to had destroyed their impartial-
ity, and whether they could render an impartial verdict based on the
evidence presented in court."" Interestingly, eight of the twelve ju-
rors who decided Mu'Min's fate had either heard or read something
about the case."'
The rationale underlying the Mu'Min decision centers on the
nexus between content questioning and the defendant's right to a fair
trial. The majority opinion recognizes the common sense notion that
content-based questions "would materially assist in obtaining a jury
less likely to be tainted by pretrial publicity than one selected with-
160. Id. at 1901-02.
161. Id. at 1902.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The questions posed by the trial court were open textured; they were leading in
the sense that civic-minded persons are apt to believe the correct response is to insist on impar-
tiality and to deny the existence of fixed opinions about guilt or innocence. In fact, only one of
the sixteen venirepersons who heard or read about the case admitted he could not be impartial.
Id. The questions read as follows:
Would the information that you heard, received, or read from whatever
source, would that information affect your impartiality in this case?
Is there anyone that would say what you've read, seen, heard, or whatever
information you may have acquired from whatever the source would affect your
impartiality so that you could not be impartial?
Considering what the ladies and gentlemen who have answered in the af-
firmative have heard or read about the case, do you believe that you can enter
the Jury box with an open mind and wait until the entire case is presented
before reaching a fixed opinion or conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused?
... In view of everything that you've seen, heard, or read, or any informa-
tion from whatever source that you've acquired about this case, is there anyone
who believes that you could not become a Juror, enter the Jury box with an
open mind and wait until the entire case is presented before reaching a fixed
opinion or a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused?
Id.
165. Id. at 1903.
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out such questions." 1" As a corollary, content questioning would be
helpful in fleshing out juror partiality. 6 Nevertheless, the majority,
while conceding these arguments, draws the line by stating that fail-
ure to ask content-based questions does not necessarily infringe upon
the accused's right to a fair trial. Accordingly, content questioning in
a criminal trial affected by pretrial publicity is not constitutionally
compelled."
Several reasons may be adduced to rebut the narrowly crafted
rationale of the Mu'Min majority. Content questioning sorts out the
extent and intensity of publicity a prospective juror has been exposed
to, thereby determining whether such exposure would lead to dis-
qualification as a matter of law. Additionally, such questioning is
necessary to buttress the trial court's finding of impartiality. A third
reason for exploring the content of publicity is to assist the trial
judge in assessing the credibility of the jurors' responses.' 69 Perhaps
the most compelling justification for requiring content questioning is
the balance fostered by the procedure. The defendant is put at a
disadvantage when he or she is not afforded the opportunity of dis-
covering the sources of what prospective jurors have read or seen.
Not only are trial judges and counsel in a weak position to weigh
challenges for cause, but the defendant's intelligent use of peremp-
tory challenges is seriously impaired. As Judge Celebrezze has per-
suasively argued, "Where veniremen have been exposed to prejudi-
cial publicity, the nature and degree of that exposure is certainly a
matter of legitimate concern to a defense attorney in deciding on pe-
remptory challenges."'" 0 Hampering the defense's intelligent use of
peremptory challenges calls into question the delicate adversarial
symmetry essential to a fair trial.
To the extent peremptory challenges help counsel eliminate
from the jury venirepersons who are otherwise qualified on the basis
of gut reaction or psychological theories, content questioning en-
hances the intelligent use of those challenges. It is difficult to assess a
juror's claim of impartiality when one is not allowed to probe the
basis for the affirmation. Furthermore, a defendant may be stripped
166. Id. at 1905.
167. Id.
168. Id. The majority relies on Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), for this
precept.
169. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. at 1913-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 155 (6th Cir. 1978); see also United
States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815, 835-38 (1983) (Engel, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1099 (1984).
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of the ability to exclude jurors for cause when content questioning is
not permitted. A telling example of this phenomenon occurred in the
murder and robbery trial of Susan Saxe. One juror, who had read
about the case but professed impartiality, was questioned at length.
The questioning prompted the juror to reveal, "[W]e all know the
girl went in and held up the bank and the policeman was shot
there."' 7 ' A fair trial in the criminal context entails an impartial
jury; in turn, the Supreme Court has equated impartiality not with
lack of opinion or preconceptions, but with the willingness to put
aside impressions or opinions and "render a verdict based on the
evidence presented in court.' 172 It is exceedingly difficult, however,
to determine true impartiality without exploring in depth the nature
and degree of bias that may have been prompted by exposure to
prejudicial pretrial publicity. Content questioning facilitates the task
through a searching inquiry into the sources of pretrial publicity a
prospective juror has encountered. In the absence of content ques-
tioning, intelligent decisions on peremptory challenges or challenges
for cause become highly unlikely. Therefore, a defendant is disad-
vantaged in eliciting juror bias and in assessing the validity of pro-
spective jurors' assertions of impartiality.
Contrary to the Mu'Min majority's deceptive reasoning, preclu-
sion of content questioning thwarts the defendant's right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. Although voir dire is not an effective
mechanism to ensure an impartial jury, it is the predominant method
employed by trial courts, and endorsed by the Supreme Court, to
detect juror bias. Thus, the defendant who is subjected to prejudicial
pretrial publicity suffers a tremendous disadvantage when prevented
from using any method, however flawed, which measures the extent
and intensity of a prospective juror's predispositions toward him or
her.
The effect of Mu'Min is to leave a criminal defendant virtually
powerless in the quest to select an impartial jury. Not only are the
odds formidable in establishing presumptive prejudice, but the de-
fendant is prevented from proving actual prejudice by probing the
extent and nature of juror exposure to adverse pretrial publicity.
Short of candid responses from potential jurors or extraordinary cir-
cumstances leading to presumed prejudice, a defendant will find it
difficult to ensure that there will be an impartial jury at trial.
Within this context, the search for an impartial jury has degenerated
171. Mu'Min v. Virginia, III S.Ct. at 1914-15 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961).
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into a game of chance.
IV. RECONCILING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WITH THE IDEAL
OF A FAIR TRIAL
Examining the contours of the free press-fair trial controversy
leaves one with a feeling of hopelessness. When these titans collide,
it seems that a proper balance is an unattainable goal. Such an ac-
commodation, however, is not an impossible task. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has failed to achieve a proper equilibrium, princi-
pally for two reasons. First, it has not acknowledged the crucial link
between the extent of media freedom and the ability of the accused to
receive a fair trial. Second, the Court has ignored the contradictory
purposes served by a free press and a fair trial. As noted at the out-
set, freedom of the press does not promote fairness; rather, freedom
of expression often causes harm." 3 On the other hand, the Sixth
Amendment is the hallmark of fairness within the context of the
criminal justice system.
The Court's failure to achieve an accommodation of these im-
portant rights stems from its failure to analytically discern the con-
nection between freedom of expression and the ideal of a fair trial.
Although the Court has been reluctant to close criminal proceedings
to the media and the public, or to place restraints on media reporting
about criminal activity, it has not compensated for this freedom by
according more leeway to a defendant who has been the subject of
pretrial publicity. At first, the Court seemingly accounted for this
disparity by creating what appeared to be a fairly broad standard for
establishing presumed prejudice. With its decision in Murphy,
17 4
however, the Court has embarked on a path which hampers the abil-
ity of the accused to establish presumed prejudice except in egregious
circumstances.1
7 5
Furthermore, the Court has placed an imposing obstacle in the
defendant's path to prove actual prejudice. Mu'Min represents the
culmination of the Court's blind faith in the process of voir dire as a
means of discovering juror bias. The new doctrine fashioned in
Mu'Min obtusely relies on the efficacy of a process which has been
discredited from a pragmatic as well as an empirical standpoint.
1 76
This misplaced reliance has reached ridiculous proportions with the
173. POWE, supra note 7, at 104.
174. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
175. See supra part III.B.
176. See supra part 1II.C.
[Vol. 321130
FAIR TRIAL/FREE PRESS
Court's assumption that open textured, generic questions asked of
panels of prospective jurors are adequate to detect juror bias.
Rather than fashioning such unrealistic standards, the Court
ought to have recognized its aversion to closure or pretrial restraints
and given defendants in highly publicized cases the remedy most
often sought: a change of venue. While it is likely that with mass
communication notorious defendants such as Manuel Noriega will
find it difficult to impanel a jury oblivious to their cases, in most
circumstances a change of venue will assist the defendant in selecting
an impartial jury. Even in such extraordinary circumstances, a
change of venue could increase the likelihood of a fair trial. In Gen-
eral Noriega's case, jury selection was complicated by the fact that
Fidel Castro was a potential witness.' 7 As a result, Cuban exiles
professed an inability to judge Noriega fairly if Castro testified at the
trial.17 8
Similarly, the Rodney King case furnishes an example of cir-
cumstances under which a nationally publicized incident led to a
change of venue. In Powell v. Superior Court,'7 9 the appellate court
ordered a change of venue to allow the defendants charged with as-
saulting Rodney King a fair trial.'8 Although the potential jury pool
in Los Angeles County was sufficiently large and diverse enough to
select a supposedly fair jury, the court deemed it wise to change the
venue."8 It noted that although the nature of modern communica-
tions limits the effectiveness of a change of venue, the political tur-
moil engendered by such a controversial case warrants a change of
venue.' 2 The political overtones in the case, moreover, are endemic
to Los Angeles and not to any other community in the United
States.'
The Powell case is instructive in another context. Where a pub-
licized case has aroused the political passion of the community, a fair
trial may be impossible. The possibility of riots if a particular verdict
is rendered casts serious doubt on the ability of the defendant to re-
177. MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 7, 1991, at 2B. col.3.
178. Id.
179. 283 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Ct. App. 1991).
180. Id. at 788.
181. Id. at 783.
182. Id. at 784 (citations omitted). The court distinguished the Manson case (People v.
Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Ct. App. 1976)), in which the publicity arose from the nature of
the crimes and not from the political issues unique to Los Angeles. Powell v. Superior Court,
283 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
183. Powell v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
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ceive a fair trial.184 Thus, the Powell court referred to the Miami
case of Officer William Lozano, who was convicted of the man-
slaughter of two black motorists. 85 The Florida appellate court re-
versed Lozano's conviction because the evidence indicated that the
conviction was influenced by the concern of the community that riots
might erupt if Lozano was acquitted. 86
In less highly publicized cases, the effectiveness of a change of
venue is more telling. For example, in Mu'Min,'8" the defendant re-
quested and could have been granted a change of venue.' 8 Given the
exposure of the jurors to adverse publicity, Mu'Min could have prof-
ited from such a procedure. Indeed, a change of venue would have
meant that Mu'Min's fate would not have been decided by jurors
who read or saw accounts indicative of his guilt and who were ex-
posed to prejudicial inadmissible evidence.'
It is true that a change of venue is regarded as an ineffective
remedy because it interferes with a defendant's right to be tried
where the crime occurred and because it frustrates the community's
desire to decide the outcome of the case.1 90 However, a defendant
who seeks a change of venue necessarily waives his or her right to a
trial in the community in which the crime occurred in order to en-
hance his or her chances of receiving a fair jury. Given the accused's
constitutional right to a fair trial, the community's interest in decid-
ing the case ought to give way to the accused's higher stake in the
outcome. After all, a defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial
jury is constitutionally protected; a community's desire to resolve the
accused's fate is not.
In determining whether a change of venue is warranted, trial
courts should defer to a defendant's request when substantial pretrial
publicity has infected prospective jurors. Where evidence reflects bi-
ases and preconceived opinions, courts must resolve doubts as to their
ability to furnish the accused a trial by a fair and impartial jury in
favor of the defendant. Prejudicial pretrial publicity reduces the
chances a defendant will receive a fair trial. Trial courts ought to
recognize that the evidence does not support the notion that voir dire
is an effective mechanism for detecting juror bias. Accordingly, they
184. Id. at 787-88.
185. Id. at 787 (citing Lozano v. Florida, 584 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
186. Lozano v. Florida, 584 So. 2d at 22-23.
187. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899 (1991).
188. Id. at 1901.
189. See supra notes 153-169, 171 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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must be more amenable to defendants' wishes for a change of venue
in cases saturated with pretrial publicity regarding the accused's
guilt.
One could object to this proposal on practical grounds because
changes of venue are administratively inconvenient and tax an al-
ready overburdened criminal justice system. Nonetheless, this objec-
tion is unwarranted in light of the miniscule number of criminal
cases which engender substantial pretrial publicity and thereby en-
danger the prospect of selecting an impartial jury.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's flawed jurisprudence in the free press-
fair trial arena derives from its indifference to the disparate roles
played by these two cherished freedoms. Fundamental fairness re-
quired in the criminal context dictates a more sensitive response than
that generated by the Court. Freedom to report on criminal cases
which concern and appeal to the community necessitates more care
for the defendant's fair trial rights. Otherwise, the grim prospect
raised by Justice Brennan, that is, "the sacrifice of precious Sixth
Amendment rights on the altar of the First Amendment," 1 could
turn into reality.
191. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 612 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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